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— Note  — 
What  Carpen te r  Te l l s  Us  About  
When a  Four th  Amendment  Sear ch  
o f  Metadata  Beg ins  
“Given the advancing state of both the remote sensing art and the 
capacity of computers to handle an uninterrupted and synoptic data 
flow, there seem to be no physical barriers left to shield us from 
intrusion.”1 
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1. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 46 (1971)). 
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Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
government searches by requiring the government to procure a warrant 
supported by probable cause that “particularly describe[es] the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” prior to searching 
persons or their homes, papers, or effects.2 Traditionally, the Supreme 
Court’s conception of the Fourth Amendment’s protection was tied to 
physical space. The government could not seek information in an indiv–
idual’s constitutionally protected areas (e.g., one’s home or office) with–
out first acquiring that individual’s permission or obtaining a warrant.3 
This made sense because people stored private information in private 
spaces, and private and public spaces were usually delineated by clear, 
physical boundaries. But as technology has advanced, the constit–
utionally-protected-area conception of the Fourth Amendment fails to 
provide adequate protection for that private information that is now 
stored, communicated, and generated digitally.  
Recognizing this technological shift in 1967, the Supreme Court in 
Katz v. United States4 adopted the view that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”5 In doing so, the Court laid down a new 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test that is not confined to constit–
utionally protected areas or tangible things, but extends outside of the 
home and office to cover electronic and digital information and other 
communications to which an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.6 
Today, over fifty years after Katz, the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has become an even more vital safeguard against 
unreasonable government intrusions that are due, in large part, to the 
Internet. As one observer noted, “the Internet is not some standalone, 
separate domain where a few of life’s functions are carried out. . . . 
Rather, it is the . . . place where virtually everything is done. It is . . . 
where the most private data is created and stored.”7 In fact, “more data 
has been created [in the years 2014 and 2015] than in the entire previous 
 
2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
3. Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012). 
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
5. Id. at 351. 
6. Id. at 352–53. 
7. Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the 
NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State 5–6 (2014). 
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history of the human race.”8 And the amount of data that is created 
and stored on the Internet continues to grow exponentially: by 2020, 
“about 1.7 megabytes of new information will be created every second 
for every human being on the planet.”9 
The data we produce using digital devices fall into two categories: 
content—the substance of digital communications and activities—and 
metadata—data about content. 10  While the content of our digital 
activities is generally agreed to be subject to Fourth Amendment prote–
ction,11 some have argued that metadata is not. In 2013, following 
Edward Snowden’s revelation that the National Security Agency was 
collecting metadata about U.S. citizens on a massive scale, Senator 
Dianne Feinstein argued that metadata is not protected under the 
Fourth Amendment.12 She reasoned that, because the records being 
collected did not include content, names, or locations, their collection 
did not qualify as surveillance.13 
But while it is true that metadata on its face is almost meaningless 
to most people, it can, when analyzed, reveal the most intimate details 
of our lives. Our digital-activity records create information-rich “meta–
data trails” that, because of metadata’s structured nature, can “often 
yield information more easily than . . . the actual content of our 
communications.”14 And the greater the quantity of metadata analyzed, 
the more revealing it can be. Large datasets can be used for everything 
from mapping an individual’s location over a period of years, to identi–
fying a person’s relationships, habits, and behaviors.15 This previously 
inaccessible source of information has the potential to make the govern–
 
8. Bernard Marr, Big Data: 20 Mind-Boggling Facts Everyone Must Read, Forbes 
(Sept. 30, 2015, 2:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/ 
 2015/09/30/big-data-20-mind-boggling-facts-everyone-must-read/#27f04f 
 2117b1 [https://perma.cc/R4RM-PCLS]. 
9. Id. 
10. Greenwald, supra note 7, at 132. 
11. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) 
(accepting Katz’s holding that a communication’s content is subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection). 
12. Dianne Feinstein, Continue NSA Call-Records Program, USA Today 
(Oct. 20, 2013, 6:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/ 
 10/20/nsa-call-records-program-sen-dianne-feinstein-editorials-debates/ 
 3112715/ [https://perma.cc/4AAL-LFXK]. 
13. Id. 
14. Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten at ¶¶ 1, 20, ACLU v. Clapper, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-3994). 
15. Id. at ¶ 24. 
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ment practically omniscient—and it is widely agreed that “police 
omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.”16 
But to hold the government accountable for analyzing our 
metadata, we must revisit one of the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental 
questions: When does the search begin?17 This question is important 
because it determines not only at what point in the process of metadata 
analysis—i.e., acquisition, analysis, or use 18—must the government 
secure a warrant, but also the ways in which the government may 
analyze and use our metadata after acquiring it.19 While the Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed this issue, it provided some guidance 
in Carpenter v. United States.20 
In Carpenter, the FBI subpoenaed 127 days of Timothy Carpenter’s 
cell-site location information (“CSLI”)—metadata in the form of time-
stamped records containing the identification number of the cell site 
that his phone was connected to at a given time—from his network 
provider.21 The Court held that “[t]he location information obtained 
from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search”;22 thus, 
the government had violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to 
acquire a warrant. The Court based its holding on its reasoning in two 
lines of cases.23 The first concerns a person’s expectation of privacy in 
their long-term physical movements.24 The second concerns “a person’s 
 
16. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 760 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting)); 
see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[F]or those extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize individuals’ 
sense of security more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is 
required.”); Greenwald, supra note 7, at 4 (“Unless such power is held 
in check by rigorous oversight and accountability, it is almost certain to 
be abused.”). 
17. See generally Orin S. Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start—and 
When Does It Stop?, Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy (July 6, 2018, 3:34 
PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/06/when-does-a-carpenter-search-
start-and-w (exploring how Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 
(2018), complicates the determination of when a search begins and ends) 
[https://perma.cc/KC3G-66NY]. 
18. Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, 
Brookings (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/research/use-
restrictions-and-the-future-of-surveillance-law/ [https://perma.cc/9SKN-
HAAN]. 
19. Kerr, supra note 17; see also infra Part III. 
20. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
21. Id. at 2212. 
22. Id. at 2217. 
23. Id. at 2214. 
24. Id. at 2209. 
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expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third 
parties.”25 Though the Court did not directly answer the question of 
when a search of metadata begins, its reasoning and the concerns it 
considered provide a foundation for determining when such a search 
begins. The answer to this question determines what the Fourth 
Amendment protects—metadata itself, or the information that results 
from its analysis—as well as how the government may use metadata it 
has legally obtained. 
This Note explores when a Fourth Amendment search of one’s 
historical metadata begins, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
and concerns in Carpenter. Part I provides an overview of what 
metadata is and what types of information its analysis can yield. It then 
takes a closer look at CSLI—the metadata at issue in Carpenter—and 
addresses the threat to privacy posed by the aggregation of large 
amounts of metadata. Part II provides a close analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Carpenter. Part III discusses the various stages in 
the process of metadata-based surveillance at which a Fourth Amend–
ment search could begin. It argues that, to best safeguard privacy, the 
search must begin not when metadata is acquired, but when it is 
analyzed to reveal private information. Part IV proposes a framework 
for analyzing when a metadata search begins. Finally, Part V suggests 
a reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity require–
ment as it pertains to historical metadata. 
I. Metadata 
This section explains what metadata is, the uses for which it is 
collected, and what it can reveal when analyzed. It then provides an in-
depth explanation of CSLI—the metadata at issue in Carpenter—and 
continues by describing the enormous range of private information that 
can be gleaned from the analysis of aggregated metadata. 
A. Types of Metadata and Its Uses 
Metadata is data about data. It does not describe a commun–
ication’s or digital activity’s content, but instead it comprises inform–
ation about that communication or activity. For instance, if you call 
your mother, the metadata about the call will not take the form of a 
transcript of the conversation. Instead, it will contain the call’s length, 
the date and time when the call took place, both the initiating and the 
receiving telephone number, the cell-site identification number of the 
cell tower your phone was connected to, and other logistical data.26 
Basically, it is just a list of numbers. Almost every digital activity we 
 
25. Id. 
26. Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 
102 Minn. L. Rev. 577, 585–86 (2017). 
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engage in leaves behind “rich metadata trails.”27 And virtually every–
thing we do while browsing the Internet or using digital devices is 
recorded and stored, “creating a permanent record of unparalleled 
pervasiveness and depth.”28 
This collection of data about our communications and activities 
may seem innocuous compared to the collection of records detailing 
those communications and activities. But when our metadata trails are 
analyzed, metadata can reveal an intimate picture of our lives.29 In fact, 
by virtue of metadata’s structured nature, metadata analysis can often 
reveal those details more easily and cost-effectively than the content of 
our communications.30 This structure makes it easy to store and quickly 
analyze vast sets of data for patterns that can reveal our “personal 
details, habits, and behaviors.”31 By contrast, to analyze the content of 
a phone call, an analyst must transcribe the conversation, determine its 
meaning (taking into account a multitude of factors including language 
differences and code phrases), and identify relevant information.32 The 
government simply does not have the resources to perform content 
analysis on the phone calls of three-hundred million Americans.33 
Although Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 gave rise to an 
Orwellian fear of government mass-surveillance, 34  in many cases, 
metadata is initially collected by private companies and only later 
acquired by the government. Wireless-network providers record the 
duration of their customers’ phone calls, the number of texts they send, 
the numbers they call, the cell sites their phones connect to, the apps 
they use, and the time they spend using the Internet. 35  Websites 
“secretly track [their] custome[rs’] websurfing,” amassing “record data 
about [their] ISP, computer hardware and software, the website [they] 
linked from, and exactly what parts of the website [they] explored and 
 
27. Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 1. 
28. Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy 
in the Information Age 26 (2004). 
29. Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, supra note 14, ¶ 1. 
30. Id. ¶¶ 1, 20–21, 29 (attributing this ease and cost-effectiveness to metadata 
being “stored in a predictable, standardized format”). 
31. Id. ¶ 24. 
32. Id. ¶ 28. 
33. Id. ¶ 29. 
34. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the 
NSA Surveillance Revelations, The Guardian (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-
whistleblower-surveillance [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-V3VK]. 
35. See infra Part I.B. 
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for how long.”36 Google acknowledges that it collects its users’ “unique 
identifiers tied to the browser, application, or device [they]’re using” as 
well as data concerning “the interaction of [the users’] apps, browsers, 
and devices . . . , including IP address, crash reports, system activity, 
and the date, time, and referrer URL.”37 Even fitness apps track and 
record metadata about their users’ health and activity.38 
These service providers generally collect this information for a 
variety of business purposes. Wireless-network providers use the 
metadata they collect to: (1) monitor and improve network perform–
ance; (2) deliver and maintain products and services; (3) monitor and 
maintain account and billing records; (4) detect misuse and assure 
security; (5) deliver marketing offers; and (6) in the case of T-Mobile, 
respond to legal processes and emergencies.39 Network providers also 
aggregate this data “for a variety of purposes such as scientific and 
marketing research and services.”40 Websites use metadata to reveal 
what parts of the website are most popular, how long a user’s attention 
span is, what language the site should be displayed in for a particular 
user, and what kinds of products a user might be interested in.41 In 
2004, in preparation for Hurricane Frances, Walmart knew to ship not 
only extra flashlights to Florida’s Atlantic Coast, but also strawberry 
Pop-Tarts and beer—products that Walmart’s data analysis showed 
sell at up to seven times their normal rate in the period immediately 
before a hurricane hits.42 
 
36. Solove, supra note 28, at 23–24. 
37. Google Privacy Policy, Google (May 25, 2018), https://www.gstatic.com/ 
 policies/privacy/pdf/20180525/853e41a3/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BD8E-QDBC]. 
38. Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near 
Perfect Surveillance, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 205, 230 (2018). 
39. Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms. 
 wirelessCustomerAgreement.html#howCanIGetMobileContent [https:// 
 perma.cc/MY96-UYTK]; Sprint Corporation Privacy Policy, Sprint, 
https://www4.sprint.com/legal/privacy.html [https://perma.cc/XV4Y-
7X7F] (last updated Mar. 29, 2017); T-Mobile Privacy Statement, T-
Mobile, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/tvision-
privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/NA8Q-HAFY] (last updated Oct. 1, 
2019); Privacy Policy, Verizon, https://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/ 
 full-privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/Y5CD-JKZZ] (last updated Apr. 2019). 
40. Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms. 
 wirelessCustomerAgreement.html#howCanIGetMobileContent [https:// 
 perma.cc/97R7-ACSA]. 
41. Solove, supra note 28, at 23–24. 
42. Constance L. Hays, What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits, 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/ 
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The same metadata that private companies use to improve their 
marketing and products is also valuable to the government for other 
purposes, namely cost-effective and minimally invasive surveillance.43 
The government often acquires metadata by wiretapping Internet 
service providers, using court-ordered warrants or subpoenas, or simply 
purchasing it from data brokers or directly from the websites that 
collect it.44 This metadata can be analyzed and searched to discover 
more information about an identified target or “to discover the 
perpetrator of a past or future event.” 45  In some cases, it reveals 
information that the government could not obtain through other means, 
allowing the government to “track individuals through places where it 
would otherwise be uneconomical to do so, [and] even through places 
where it would otherwise be effectively impossible for the government 
to do so, such as within the surveillance target’s own home or office.”46 
Historical metadata even allows the government to go back in time to 
track a suspect.47 
B. CSLI 
In Carpenter v. United States, Carpenter challenged the govern–
ment’s warrantless acquisition of his cell-site location information—the 
metadata generated every time a phone connects to a cell site. Cell 
phones perform most of their functions by connecting to radio antennas 
owned by wireless-network providers.48 These radio antennas and the 
towers that house them are commonly referred to as “cell sites.”49 A 
 
 business/yourmoney/what-walmart-knows-about-customers-habits.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2PW-GTD9]. 
43. Kerr, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
44. Bryan Bumgardner, How Are the NSA and Others Collecting and Using 
Our Data?, Sci. Am. (June 20, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
 article/how-are-the-nsa/ [https://perma.cc/8BTH-GQ9C]; Bruce Schneier, 
Do You Want the Government Buying Your Data from Corporations?, 
The Atlantic (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
 archive/2013/04/do-you-want-the-government-buying-your-data-from-
corporations/275431/ [https://perma.cc/FU5W-XQXW]. 
45. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 322–23 (2008). 
46. Brief of Technology Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
28–29, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) 
(emphasis in original). 
47. Slobogin, supra note 45, at 322–23. 
48. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Matthew Tart et al., Historic Cell Site 
Analysis—Overview of Principles and Survey Methodologies, 8 Digital 
Investigations 185, 186 (2012). 
49. Eric Pait, Find My Suspect: Tracking People in the Age of Cell Phones, 
2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 155, 157 (2017). 
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cell phone typically connects to surrounding cell sites and pushes 
through data via the strongest connection, which is often, but not 
always, the cell site in closest proximity to that phone.50 As the phone 
is carried from place to place, “its connection transfers from cell site to 
cell site, maintaining a continuous connection with the strongest 
available signal.”51 
 When a cell phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-
stamped record containing metadata about that connection (aka, 
CSLI), which is collected and stored by the wireless-network provider 
that owns the cell site.52 CSLI includes the identification number of the 
cell site (“Cell ID”) that the phone initially connected to, the date and 
time the connection was made, the phone numbers involved, and often 
the Cell ID of the site the phone was connected to when the call ended.53 
When analyzed, this information can reveal a cell phone’s general 
location, and by proxy, its user’s location, at the time the record was 
generated. 54  If enough CSLI records are analyzed, it is possible to 
observe “the whole of [a person’s] physical movements.”55  
 
56 
While wireless-network providers collect and retain CSLI for a 
variety of business purposes,57 their data-collection efforts have also 
 
50. Tart et al., supra note 48. 
51. Pait, supra note 49. 
52. Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t 
Require a Warrant, The Atlantic (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic. 
 com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-tracking-csli-
warrant/478197/ [https://perma.cc/8K45-FNJD]. 
53. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185. 
54. Id. at 188. 
55. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). In 2009, Malte 
Spitz, a German politician, sued his wireless-network provider because it 
refused to disclose to Spitz the CSLI generated by his cell phone. Tell-All 
Telephone, Zeit Online, https://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-
data-retention [https://perma.cc/BE7S-CV2X] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
In settlement, Spitz received six months of metadata his wireless-network 
provider had collected. Id. Together with Zeit Online, he created an 
interactive map of his movements, calls, tests, and internet connectivity 
revealed by analyzing the six months of metadata. Id. To get a sense of 
the historical surveillance capacity of CSLI, see id. 
56. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 188. 
57. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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been a boon for law enforcement officials who can now determine a 
suspected criminal’s present and past locations simply by analyzing the 
CSLI generated by the suspect’s cell phone.58 Because most individuals 
keep their cell phones with them at all times, the analysis of this 
historical CSLI can paint a detailed picture of their past movements, 
information that may otherwise be unavailable to law enforcement.59 
And law enforcement taps this power frequently, requesting historical 
CSLI from phone companies tens of thousands of times each year.60 
After law enforcement acquires an individual’s CSLI from a phone 
company, it must analyze it “in conjunction with other information 
such as survey and geographic data, to determine areas where a phone 
may, or may not, have been when it was used.”61 The first step is to 
combine the CSLI with a database containing, for instance, the location 
of the cell sites that correspond to the Cell IDs in the records.62 Next, 
law enforcement must determine “the area over which the cell [site] 
could be expected to provide service and whether or not this includes 
specific locations of interest to the investigation.”63 The precision of the 
location information gleaned from CSLI is determined by the cell 
coverage area,64 which depends on a variety of factors, including “the 
height of the [cell] antenna (aerial), the power used, the location of 
other cells and the geography of the land (hills, trees, etc.) including 
 
58. Pait, supra note 49, at 158. 
59. Id. at 156, 160–61. 
60. Law enforcement is not required to keep records of how many CSLI 
requests they make each year, but a rough estimation can be made based 
on the transparency reports of major wireless-network providers. See 
Freiwald & Smith, supra note 38, at 232. From January 2018 through 
June 2018, AT&T received 42,180 demands from law enforcement for the 
CSLI records of its users. AT&T, Transparency Report 4 (Aug. 2018), 
https://about.att.com/ecms/dam/csr/aug2018/TransparencyReports/A
ug-2018-TransparencyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EER-Y5VM]. In 2017, 
T-Mobile received 64,266 CSLI demands. T-Mobile US Inc., Trans–
parency Report for 2017, at 6 (2017), https://www.t-mobile.com/ 
 content/dam/t-mobile/corporate/newsroom/pages/factsheetspdf/ 
 TransparencyReport2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHP2-BDMA]. See also 
Verizon, Transparency Report 1H 2018, https://www.verizon.com/ 
 about/portal/transparency-report/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ 
 Transparency-Report-US-21-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4CZ-3UAQ]; 
Sprint, Sprint Corporation Transparency Report (Jan. 2018), 
https://newsroom.sprint.com/csr/content/1214/files/Transparency%20R
eport%20January%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN2P-PPMU] (listing 
law enforcement’s demands for customer information by type of request). 
61. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 185. 
62. Id. at 187. 
63. Id. 
64. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
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surrounding buildings.”65 While it is true that CSLI is not as precise as 
GPS coordinates, 66  the growing demand for cell-phone data has 
prompted wireless-network providers to install more and more cell sites, 
resulting in smaller coverage areas for each cell site, thereby increasing 
the precision of the collected location information.67 Today, the cover–
age area of a cell site can range from twenty kilometers in rural areas 
to as little as one hundred meters in densely populated areas like 
shopping malls.68 
It is unclear exactly how many CSLI data points wireless-network 
providers collect from a cell phone each day. But in Carpenter, 
MetroPCS and Sprint together provided the government with 127 days 
of CSLI from Timothy Carpenter’s phone, totaling 12,898 location 
points.69 This means that, on average, Sprint and MetroPCS collected 
101 data points per day from Carpenter’s phone.70 It is also unclear 
what types of phone activity cause CSLI to be generated and stored.71 
If, however, most providers are like T-Mobile—one of the few wireless-
network providers that discloses the types of activities that generate 
CSLI—they probably collect CSLI every time a cell phone is “turned 
on, calls and text messages [are] sen[t] or receive[d] . . . , and other 
data services [are] use[d].”72 
C. The Aggregation Problem 
Most metadata can be analyzed in various ways to produce different 
types of information. A single CSLI record, for example, could be analy–
zed in one way to reveal the user’s general location at the time she 
placed a call, and in another way to reveal who she called. But the risk 
that the government might analyze metadata to reveal information it 
did not originally seek is exacerbated by the aggregation problem. 
While discrete pieces of metadata can reveal highly private information, 
 
65. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 186. 
66. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
67. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12. 
68. Tart et al., supra note 48, at 186. 
69. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
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72. T-Mobile Privacy Statement, T-Mobile, https://www.t-mobile.com/ 
 responsibility/privacy/privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/EC7B-6HYK] (last 
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aggregated metadata can expose much more. 73  When metadata is 
amassed in large quantities and analyzed, patterns and correlations 
start to emerge.74 And those patterns can reveal information that is 
fundamentally different from what could be gleaned through isolated, 
relatively innocuous pieces of metadata.75 
By analyzing aggregated call records, the government can create a 
detailed map of a person’s social network, including his or her friends, 
family, colleagues, psychiatrists, insurance providers, doctors, baby–
sitters, lawyers, and so on.76 These records can reveal not only who 
someone calls, but the nature of the caller’s relationship with the call’s 
recipient.77 People who call each other every week likely have a closer 
relationship than those who speak only once a year.78 Two people who 
frequently call each other late at night might be in a relationship; if 
they stop calling, the relationship has probably ended.79 If two people 
talk only between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., they likely have a prof–
essional relationship. Metadata can even reveal people’s relative power 
and social status. The Economist noted that “[p]eople at the top of the 
office or social pecking order often receive quick callbacks, do not worry 
about calling other people late at night and tend to get more calls at 
times when social events are most often organi[z]ed, such as Friday 
afternoons.”80 This analysis reveals information about not only the 
person being surveilled, but also about people who were never the 
intended targets of that surveillance.81 
Highly personal information can also be discovered by analyzing a 
sequence of calls in context. 82  Edward Felten, Deputy U.S. Chief 
Technology Officer during the Obama Administration,83 provides the 
following illustration: 
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80. Untangling the Social Web, The Economist (Sept. 4, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2010/09/04/untangling- 
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A young woman calls her gynecologist; then immediately calls her 
mother; then a man who, during the past few months, she had 
repeatedly spoken to on the telephone after 11pm; followed by a 
call to a family planning center that also offers abortions. A likely 
storyline emerges that would not be as evident by examining the 
record of a single telephone call.84 
Location metadata, too, can reveal deeply private information 
“because of the common sense observation that individuals often go to 
particular locations for particular purposes.”85 A person’s location met–
adata that contains repeat visits to a particular church every Sunday 
morning might reveal his religion. Another’s metadata containing 
regular visits to that same church every Tuesday evening might reveal 
that he is attending an addiction-support group. 
In Carpenter, the Court acknowledged that a person may have a 
greater expectation of privacy in her aggregated location information 
because of the power that aggregation has to reveal information that 
would be otherwise unavailable.86 Aggregation can reveal information 
that a surveillance target never made a conscious decision to share; 
information that once could have been acquired only by examining the 
content of a person’s communications;87 information that, if stored in a 
physical form, the government could acquire only with a warrant. 
II. What Carpenter Told Us 
Carpenter is the first Supreme Court case to address an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights with regard to historical metadata. In 
holding that the government must obtain a warrant to “access[] hist–
orical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the 
user’s past movements,”88 the Court broke new ground in ensuring 
individuals’ digital privacy. This Part discusses the facts of Carpenter 
and the analysis the Supreme Court used to determine that individuals 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to their aggregated 
CSLI. 
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A. The Facts 
In 2011, the Detroit Police Department arrested four people it 
suspected of breaking into a series of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores 
in Michigan and Ohio.89 One of the suspects admitted that the group 
had robbed nine different stores over a four-month period. 90  After 
confessing, the suspect provided the FBI with the names and cell-phone 
numbers of fifteen other individuals who he claimed were accomplices 
in one or more of those robberies.91 Timothy Ivory Carpenter was one 
of those named individuals.92 Based on the suspect’s information, the 
prosecutors sought court orders under the Stored Communications Act 
to acquire 152 days of Carpenter’s CSLI from his wireless-network 
providers.93 The Stored Communications Act requires only that the 
prosecutor presents “specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records . . . sought 
are relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.”94 Finding that 
this standard had been met, a magistrate judge issued two orders to 
produce Carpenter’s CSLI.95 
The first order directed MetroPCS, Carpenter’s network-service 
provider, to hand over 152 days of his CSLI. The second directed Sprint, 
the network Carpenter’s phone had connected to for a week while it 
was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio, to hand over seven days of CSLI. 
The CSLI sought included “call detail records . . . [and] cell site info–
rmation from the target telephones at call origination and at call 
termination for incoming and outgoing calls.”96 In response, MetroPCS 
produced 127 days of records. Sprint produced two.97 All told, the 
government obtained 12,898 CSLI data points tracing Carpenter’s 
movements over the course of more than four months.98 In addition to 
the CSLI itself, MetroPCS and Sprint provided the locations and other 
details of each of their cell sites in Michigan and Ohio, including the 
 
89. Id. at 2212. 
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93. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
96. Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); see 
also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (explaining that the magistrate judges 
issued orders directing Carpenter’s cellular carriers to disclose the cell-site 
information for his phone during the four-month period of the robberies). 
97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
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longitude, latitude, physical address, and directional orientation of each 
antenna. 99  By cross-referencing Carpenter’s CSLI with the cell-site 
information, the government was able to connect Carpenter’s cell 
phone’s physical location to four of the robberies.100 
The government charged Carpenter with six counts of aiding and 
abetting a robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act.101 Before trial, Carp–
enter moved to suppress the cell-site evidence on the ground that the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining his CSLI 
records without a warrant supported by probable cause.102 The district 
court rejected that argument, accepting the government’s position that 
Carpenter had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his CSLI because 
it served merely as a “proxy for [his] visually observable locat–
ion . . . along public highways.”103 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone 
location records because they qualified as business records obtained 
from a third party. 104  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-site 
records.105 
B. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts declared that “[a]s 
technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon 
areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to 
‘assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that 
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”106 This principle 
has guided the evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment as the technological revolution has progressed.107 
The Chief Justice observed that, traditionally, the Court’s interpre–
tation of the Fourth Amendment has been “tied to common-law tres–
 
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-
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100. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13. 
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102. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
103. United States v. Carpenter, No. 12-20218, 2013 WL 6385838, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 6, 2013), aff’d, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
104. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888–89 (6th Cir. 2016); see also 
infra Part II.C.2. 
105. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
106. Id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) 
(alteration in original)). 
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pass and focused on whether the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.”108 But the 
Court severed this tie between property rights and privacy rights in 
Katz v. United States.109 In Katz, the government attached a recording 
device to the outside of a public telephone booth that Katz used to 
transmit wagering information and submitted the recordings of Katz’s 
side of the conversation as evidence at trial.110 The government argued 
that the booth was not a constitutionally protected area; and even if it 
was, the recording device did not physically penetrate the phone 
booth.111 
The Court rejected those arguments, holding that intruding on a 
defendant’s physical property is not necessary to invoke the Fourth 
Amendment because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”112 In so holding, the Court created a reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy standard that redefined the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated a two-
part test to define what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
(1) the person must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; 
and (2) that expectation must be “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 113  Justice Harlan’s test has been widely 
adopted by subsequent courts,114 which have measured objective reaso–
nableness by “historical understandings ‘of what was deemed an 
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was 
adopted.’”115 
After establishing that Katz provides the relevant standard, Chief 
Justice Roberts noted that two lines of cases emerged from Katz that 
were applicable in Carpenter.116 The first concerns “a person’s expect–
ation of privacy in his physical location and movements.”117 The second 
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concerns whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he has shared with a third party.118 
1. Expectation of Privacy in Physical Location and Movements 
In the first line of cases, the Court considered its prior holding in 
United States v. Knotts119 and the concurring opinions in United States 
v. Jones.120 In Knotts, the government suspected Knotts and his co-
defendants, Petschen and Armstrong, of manufacturing illicit drugs 
after the M3 Company, a chemical manufacturer, reported to the police 
that Armstrong—one of its employees—had been stealing chemicals 
that could be used to manufacture illicit drugs.121 Visual surveillance of 
Armstrong revealed that he continued to purchase the same type of 
chemicals from another local chemical company after the M3 Company 
terminated him. 122  With the chemical company’s consent, officers 
installed a radio beeper—a device that emits periodic radio signals that 
can be picked up with a receiver—in a drum of chloroform later 
purchased by Armstrong.123 The officers then used both the beeper and 
visual surveillance to tail Armstrong and Petschen to Knotts’s property, 
where the drugs were being manufactured. 124  The Court rejected 
Knotts’s Fourth Amendment claim, stating that he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements over public thoroughfares.125 
Similarly, in Jones, the government, without a valid warrant, 
attached a GPS monitor to the undercarriage of Jones’s Jeep.126 The 
government argued that attaching the GPS monitor was the equivalent 
of the beeper in Knotts, and that Jones had “no reasonable expectation 
of privacy . . . in the locations of the Jeep on public roads, which were 
visible to all.”127 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia determined that 
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the 
government “occupied private property [the undercarriage of Jones’s 
Jeep] for the purpose of obtaining information.”128 In doing so, the 
government’s action fell under the traditional property-based approach 
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to Fourth Amendment analysis.129 Though Justice Scalia acknowledged 
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, he concluded that Katz 
did not overrule the traditional property-based analysis, but added an 
additional method of analysis.130 
Even though all nine justices joined in Justice Scalia’s holding that 
the government had violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Soto–
mayor (writing for herself) and Justice Alito (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) wrote separately, advocating that the 
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test was the proper standard. 
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito argued that individuals have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements, and that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”131 Justice Soto–
mayor and Justice Alito observed that, while Jones’s location had been 
gleaned by intruding on Jones’s private property, a Fourth Amendment 
violation would have occurred even if the government had not used 
technology necessitating such an intrusion.132 
Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that when amassed, location 
information can reveal intimate details about a person’s life—including 
“their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on”—that 
could not be learned by examining an individual’s location through 
short-term surveillance. 133  Accordingly, she argued that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their long-term physical 
location. 134  Justice Alito, in turn, noted that historically, privacy 
protections were often practical as much as constitutional. 135  He 
explained that as technology advances and makes increasingly pervasive 
surveillance more practical, measuring the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections using a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard is 
necessary to protect people from unreasonable government intrusion.136 
In Carpenter, the majority employed the logic of Justice Sotomayor 
and Justice Alito’s Jones opinions to hold that the broad scope of the 
location information acquired by the government violated Carpenter’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical 
movements.137 The Court emphasized that the ease of CSLI’s acquis– 
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ition and analysis, its aggregation over a four-month period, and its 
retrospective quality were all factors indicating that Fourth Amend–
ment protection should apply.138 
2. Expectation of Privacy in Information Shared with Third Parties 
In the second line of cases, the Court considered whether 
individuals retain an expectation of privacy in information they share 
with third parties. In the first of those cases, United States v. Miller,139 
the government subpoenaed Miller’s bank records after he was 
suspected of defrauding the government of whiskey taxes.140 The Court 
applied the Katz test and held that Miller had no reasonable expect–
ation of privacy in his bank records because the records were 
“negotiable instruments,” not private papers. 141  By revealing those 
instruments to the bank, a third party, Miller assumed the risk that 
they might be shared with the government.142 This idea became known 
as the “third-party doctrine,” whereby an individual does not maintain 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in information they 
voluntarily share with a third party.143 
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,144 the Court again applied 
the third-party doctrine. Smith claimed that the warrantless install–
ation of a pen register—a device that records the telephone numbers 
dialed from a particular phone—in his telephone company’s central 
office to record the numbers he dialed was a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 145  But, applying the Katz analysis, the Court 
expressed doubt that individuals subjectively expect that the numbers 
they dial are private.146 Even if Smith had subjectively believed that 
the numbers were private, the Court determined that this expectation 
was not objectively reasonable because by voluntarily sharing the 
numbers with the telephone company, Smith forfeited his reasonable 
expectation of privacy.147 
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In its decision not to apply the third-party doctrine in Carpenter, 
the Court noted that “Smith and Miller . . . did not rely solely on the 
act of sharing. Instead, they considered ‘the nature of the particular 
documents sought’ to determine whether ‘there is a legitimate “expect–
ation of privacy” concerning their contents.’”148 The Court determined 
that, despite being in the possession of a third party, CSLI is not 
“shared” in the normal sense because the decision to share CSLI is not 
conscious or voluntary.149 The Court reasoned that cell-phone use is 
“‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is 
indispensable to participation in modern society.”150 Furthermore, cell 
phones record CSLI as a “dint of their operation, without any affirm–
ative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”151 As Justice 
Sotomayor observed in Jones, the third-party doctrine may require 
reconsideration in this digital age so as not to make secrecy “a prereq–
uisite for privacy.”152 The Carpenter Court seems to have agreed; its 
interpretation of the third-party doctrine represents a significant 
narrowing of the doctrine’s scope.153 
3. What Carpenter Tells Us About When the Search Begins 
While the Carpenter Court told us that “the information obtained 
from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search,” it did 
not tell us at what point that search began.154 The Court alternated 
between the terms “access” and “acquire” to refer to the government’s 
actions.155 Its use of those terms provides little guidance, however, as 
the Court used the terms interchangeably, yet seemingly assigned them 
distinct, undefined meanings. Even so, the Court’s rationales and 
considerations provide an excellent foundation for determining when a 
search of metadata begins. 
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III. Stages of Digital Surveillance Using Metadata 
and a Result-Oriented Application of Fourth 
Amendment Metadata Analysis 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.”156 As 
such, Fourth Amendment analyses must evolve to “assure[] preserv–
ation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” 157  This Part describes the 
various stages at which a Fourth Amendment search could be said to 
begin regarding metadata-based surveillance. Furthermore, this Part 
argues that an acquisition-based model—determining that the search 
begins when the government obtains metadata—would often be insuff–
icient to safeguard privacy in the digital age. At least where most 
historical metadata are concerned, privacy is better protected by a 
result-oriented model—finding that a search begins when metadata is 
analyzed to reveal meaningful information, not when raw metadata is 
acquired by the government. 
There are several basic stages of digital surveillance at which a 
search could begin: (1) data collection, (2) data analysis, (3) disclosure 
to a person of the results of analysis, and (4) public disclosure.158 The 
first stage, data collection, occurs when the government acquires data 
by accessing and copying it.159 In Carpenter, this occurred when the 
wireless-network provider sent a copy of Carpenter’s unanalyzed CSLI 
records to law enforcement. 
The second stage, data analysis, occurs when the government 
manipulates the data it has acquired to “achieve particular goals.”160 
This manipulation commonly involves transferring the data to a 
database and combining it with another database in a way that gives 
meaning to and contextualizes the original data.161 At this stage, the 
data are manipulated by a computer and neither the data nor the 
results of its analysis are viewed by a human analyst.162 CSLI is manip–
ulated first by aggregating it into a database then combining that 
database with a second set of data containing the location of, and other 
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information about, the cell sites that correspond to the Cell IDs in the 
CSLI.163 
The third stage, disclosure to a person, occurs when “an individual 
with proper access to the database receives the fruits of the [prior] data 
collection and [analysis].”164 An analyst can do this by searching or 
querying the machine-manipulated data to access information in an 
intelligible form. 165  Using CSLI, this step occurs when the analyst 
queries the combined CSLI and the informational databases to create a 
map of the user’s historical location.166 
The final stage of the metadata-surveillance process, public disclos–
ure, occurs when the government discloses or uses the information it 
has gleaned from the data.167 In Carpenter, this occurred when the 
government presented at trial the location evidence derived from 
Carpenter’s historical CSLI records.168 
Traditionally, a search for tangible evidence stored in physical 
space begins when the government breaches a private space where it 
believes the evidence is stored.169 “The reasons for this focus are largely 
historical”: 170  the framers were concerned with limiting the 
government’s power to intrude upon and seize private citizens and their 
property. Thus, “[t]he Fourth Amendment was enacted to limit the 
government’s ability to break into homes and other private spaces in 
order to take away private property. Breaking into the home was a 
search. Taking away property was a seizure.”171 But generally, there is 
no private space breached when conducting a metadata search because 
most metadata is stored on third-party-owned servers. So at what stage 
in the metadata-based surveillance does the equivalent of a breach 
occur? 
The intuitive answer is that the search begins at stage one: data 
acquisition.172 Requiring the government to procure a warrant before it 
acquires metadata would mean that the government could not secretly 
amass huge stores of metadata. This idea is highly appealing in light of 
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the government’s vast data-collection capacity.173 If the government 
does not possess data, it cannot misuse it. 174 But a result-oriented 
approach will ultimately better protect our privacy because it is not 
until step three—when the data are given meaning through analysis 
and exposure to human eyes—that metadata reveals private infor–
mation. If a search begins when a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is infringed upon,175 then it is not until step three that the 
search beings. 
Two considerations support this view. First, acquiring metadata 
does not violate personal security in the same way a physical search 
does. The government entering a person’s home is highly invasive. 
Acquiring metadata from a person’s wireless-network provider is more 
innocuous because, to most people, that metadata is facially meaning–
less; only after the metadata is analyzed does it reveal private inform–
ation. For example, CSLI is comprised of numbers that are meaningless 
without analysis.176 A map of a person’s historical location does not 
emerge until the Cell IDs in CSLI are cross-referenced with information 
about the geographic area served by the corresponding cell sites.177 
Thus, a person’s sense of security and privacy is violated only by the 
information the government obtains after its analysis, not by the 
information’s initial acquisition. 
The second consideration involves determining when the search 
ends. In Illinois v. Andreas,178 the Supreme Court found that “once 
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its 
owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost.” 179  The Court’s logic 
supports the idea that once the government is in legal possession of 
information, it need not obtain further warrants to use that information 
in other ways or for other purposes. But this poses a distinct privacy 
risk because analyzing metadata in different ways and in different 
combinations can result in different information than that which the 
metadata was originally acquired to reveal.180 Indeed, the Carpenter 
Court emphasized that its reasoning rested at least in part on the fact 
that CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”181 But 
an individual’s privacy is better protected from the government’s 
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repeated and varied use of her information if the government can only 
acquire her metadata without a warrant; if the government wants to 
analyze it in a particular way, it must get a warrant for that specific 
purpose. 
IV. When the Search of Metadata Begins: A 
Framework for Analysis 
To pinpoint when a search of historical metadata begins, and at 
what point the government must acquire a warrant to analyze that 
data, an analytical framework is necessary for determining when an 
invasion of privacy occurs. While Carpenter does not enumerate all the 
types of private information that the Fourth Amendment protects (nor 
does this Note attempt to do so), it does provide the basic framework 
for analyzing when the search of metadata begins. 
A. Identifying the Information Sought 
The first step in determining at what stage of surveillance a search 
of metadata begins is to determine what is ultimately being sought by 
law enforcement. Two possibilities are that law enforcement is after (1) 
the metadata itself, or (2) the information produced by analyzing that 
metadata. 
Using an acquisition-based model, one would have expected the 
Carpenter Court to have asked whether Carpenter had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his CSLI itself because that was what the 
government acquired from Carpenter’s wireless-network provider. But 
the Court did not phrase its question in those terms. Instead, it asked 
whether Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole 
of his physical movements.182 This question is striking because it is 
focused on the information—Carpenter’s historical location over a 
period of time—that results from the government’s analysis, not the 
raw metadata. The Court’s phrasing suggests that Carpenter’s privacy 
was infringed upon (and thus the search began) not when the 
government acquired his raw CSLI metadata, but when the govern–
ment’s analysis of his CSLI yielded information about the whole of his 
physical movements.183 
This result-oriented approach makes sense for two reasons. First, 
determining whether unanalyzed CSLI is protected by a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is an abstract and difficult inquiry. Most physical 
privacy concerns are intuitive, but generally this is not the case in the 
digital context. For most people, the idea of law enforcement acquiring 
a set of numbers generated by their cell phones is not as worrisome as 
law enforcement entering their homes without permission. Home 
invasion is concrete; numbers are abstract. Metadata’s abstraction is 
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likely responsible for most people’s (including the judiciary’s) lack of 
understanding about what information can actually be gleaned from 
those numbers. That lack of understanding, in turn, blurs the line 
between privacy in the traditional sense and privacy in the modern, 
digital era. 
Second, most metadata can be analyzed in various ways to produce 
different types of information, not all of which may be subject to the 
same expectations of privacy.184 For example, the CSLI generated when 
one makes a call typically includes the date and time the call was 
initiated, the phone numbers of the persons making and receiving the 
call, and the Cell ID of the cell sites to which the phone is connected.185 
This information can be analyzed to show the historical location of the 
cell-phone user and all the people that user called.186 While the Jones 
and Carpenter Courts held that people have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the whole of their physical movements, in Smith v. 
Maryland, the Court held that individuals do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. 187  So 
although CSLI used to determine a user’s location is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, that same metadata is not 
protected if it is used to determine the user’s network of associations. 
Asking what information is being sought as a result of metadata 
analysis remedies both problems. It is a concrete inquiry informed by 
years of social expectations upon which we can make the determination 
about whether metadata is subject to and protected by a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. It also allows us to distinguish between permis–
sible and impermissible uses of metadata. Based on the Carpenter 
Court’s phrasing, the government is free to collect and store raw 
metadata, but it must acquire a warrant if it hopes to analyze that 
metadata to glean information that is subject to a reasonable expect–
ation of privacy. 
B. Determining Whether That Information is Subject to a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy 
The second step in determining at what stage of surveillance a 
search of metadata begins is to determine whether the information 
sought by the government is subject to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and, therefore, protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Katz 
test asks whether a person has both a subjective and objective expect–
ation of privacy in the thing being searched.188 “The first part of the 
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Katz test requires only that [a person] have exhibited an expectation of 
privacy—in other words, that his conduct [has] demonstrated an 
intention to keep [his] activities and things . . . private, and that he 
did not knowingly expose them to open view of the public.”189 But the 
Supreme Court’s decisions leading up to Carpenter have raised doubt 
regarding whether a defendant’s subjective expectations are relevant in 
determining whether a defendant’s expectation of privacy is a 
reasonable one. In the Court’s cases leading up to Carpenter, it seems 
to have abandoned or give serious consideration to the subjective 
prong.190 The Carpenter majority, too, declined to consider Carpenter’s 
subjective expectations, indicating that this oft-recited requirement is 
no longer relevant.191 
The second part of the Katz test—whether the expectation of 
privacy at issue is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable’”192—is more complex. In United States v. White,193 Justice 
Harlan explained that “[t]his question must . . . be answered by 
assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its 
impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the utility 
of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”194 He went on to 
explain that “intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of 
security which is the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment 
liberties” are subject to Fourth Amendment protection.195 This determ–
ination largely depends on judges’ normative values. 196  But the 
Carpenter and Jones Courts have taken steps to ground that inquiry 
by emphasizing that Fourth Amendment protection should be based on 
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“historical understandings ‘of what was deemed an unreasonable search 
and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.’”197 
And so, if a judge finds that a defendant’s expectation of privacy 
does not satisfy the Katz test, the government would not need a warrant 
to analyze the defendant’s metadata—the analysis would reveal only 
unprotected information. But if a judge determines that the information 
is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, the government must 
acquire a warrant prior to such analysis. 
C. An Exception to the Result-Oriented Model and How the Third-Party 
Doctrine Applies 
The Carpenter Court held that the third-party doctrine is not 
applicable to CSLI because CSLI is not truly voluntarily shared by a 
cell-phone user, rather it is generated purely as a function of using a 
cell phone.198 But the Court conflated the claim that a cell-phone user 
voluntarily shares raw metadata by agreeing to a cell-phone contract 
with the more dubious claim that a cell-phone user voluntarily shares 
the whole of her physical location just by using her cell phone. By 
signing a cell-phone contract, users consent to their network providers 
both collecting phone-use metadata and using that metadata for 
various, vaguely phrased purposes enumerated in the contract.199 But 
because no cell-phone contract informs a cell-phone user that their cell 
phone’s metadata can be recorded and analyzed, a user cannot be said 
to have voluntarily shared that information. 200  It follows that the 
government may collect and store raw, unanalyzed metadata without a 
warrant because that metadata is subject to the third-party doctrine; 
but it may not analyze that metadata to reveal information that was 
not voluntarily revealed because the third-party doctrine does not apply 
to that information. 
Most metadata about a particular person is generated and stored 
by third parties, but in the rare case the metadata is collected by the 
individual whom the data concerns—and is stored on her private 
servers—the search would begin when the government acquires that 
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data. In this situation, the third-party doctrine simply does not apply, 
even to the raw metadata, because the information has not been shared 
with a third party. Furthermore, although the information in question 
is stored digitally, it is stored in a private space, and intruding into 
that space would constitute an invasion of an individual’s traditional 
trespass-based right to privacy.201 
V. What the Warrant Must Contain 
If a Fourth Amendment search of metadata begins when it is 
analyzed to reveal meaningful information, it is necessary to reinterpret 
the warrant requirements—what it means to “particularly describ[e] the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”202—in the 
context of metadata. First, when analyzing metadata, there is often no 
physical “place” or “thing” where the search occurs. Nevertheless, 
something is being searched. Traditionally, the place to be searched 
presumably contains the subject of the search. The same is true for 
metadata. Just as one enters a house through the front door, one 
“enters” metadata through analysis. 
Second, “things to be seized” must be similarly interpreted to 
include the private information sought by analyzing the metadata. In 
recent years, courts have frequently interpreted digital information to 
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In 2010, the Sixth 
Circuit described email as “the technological scion of tangible mail.”203 
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Riley v. California204 held that the police, 
without a warrant, may not search the contents of a cell phone 
belonging to a person in police custody.205 The Court compared search–
ing the digital contents of a cell phone to “rummag[ing] at will among 
a person’s private effects.”206 Understanding “things to be searched” to 
include categories of private information that can be generated by 
analyzing metadata is only the next step in the evolution of the Fourth 
Amendment in the modern electronic age. 
In sum, a warrant acquired to analyze metadata in a way that will 
likely reveal information subject to Fourth Amendment protection must 
particularly describe both the metadata to be analyzed and the private 
information to be seized. 
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Conclusion 
Technology is evolving at a rapid pace, and with it the 
government’s surveillance capabilities. “[A]s late as 1900, [law 
enforcement] involved little more than an able-bodied man who was 
given a hickory club, a whistle, and a key to a call box.”207 Today, law 
enforcement can click a button and, through metadata analysis, 
retroactively surveil anyone who uses technology. Determining that a 
Fourth Amendment search begins when the government analyzes meta–
data, rather than when it acquires that data, is the best means of 
protecting the privacy and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amend–
ment. 
It is true that this result-oriented framework is broad and would 
require the government to seek a greater number of warrants when 
conducting historical metadata-based surveillance. But the result-
oriented framework is crucial if the Fourth Amendment is to adequately 
protect people from an improper governmental search. Under this 
approach, individuals would retain their privacy interest in information 
that might otherwise be revealed by analyzing their metadata because 
the government would be required to apply for a new warrant for each 
different type of protected information it seeks—even after the police 
legally acquired that metadata.208 Only after obtaining a new warrant 
could the government aggregate and reaggregate metadata to reveal 
additional private information protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
For, as Justice White observed in United States v. Karo, 209  “[t]he 
argument that a warrant requirement would oblige the government to 
obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a compelling 
argument against the requirement.”210 Indeed, this increased burden is 
required to preserve the security and privacy of individuals against 
unreasonable government invasion; and it is a small price for law 
enforcement to pay in exchange for access to citizens’ personal 
information that is inexpensive, “effortlessly compiled,”211 and “other–
wise unknowable.”212 
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